(To see other maps in this series, view all Somalia updates.)
This is the second of a set of three Somalia reports published in June 2025 covering the past two years of Somalia's civil war, here mapping the situation as of late June 2024. See also our simultaneously-published reports illustrating the situation as of August 2023 and June 2025.
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Base map by Koen Adams of onestopmap.com, with design and control by Evan Centanni. To use this map in your own materials, please contact us to arrange permission.
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Mapping Somalia in 2024: Al Shabaab Stalemate and the Height of ISIS Control
This report covers the period in Somalia’s civil war from August 26, 2023 to June 28, 2024, before the events of early 2025, which would see a major Al Shabaab resurgence in central Somalia, as well as the retreat of the so-called “Islamic State” (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) during Puntland state’s “Operation Lightning’” (Hilaac) in the remote mountains of the north. In retrospect, the time from mid-2023 to mid-2024 now looks like a period of relative calm – particularly as the war between Somaliland and SSC-Khatumo settled into a state of frozen conflict - but there were still a number of important developments, which are summarized in the following paragraphs and covered in more detail in the event timeline further below (where additional sources are cited in the form of in-line links). In brief, this period included:
- The rollback of recent pro-federal gains in central Somalia's Galgadud region after the coalition's defeat at Osweyne, returning Al Shabaab’s area of control there to its previous extent from 2022 (including Elbur and, for a time, Eldher as well)
- Federal-aligned forces’ temporary capture, lasting for several months, of the most prominent settlements held by Al Shabaab in neighboring Mudug region (Ba’adweyn, Amara, and Qey’ad), and lasting control of Bulo Haji, a key outpost in Lower Juba
- The defeat of Al Shabaab in northern Somalia's Almiskat Mountains at the hands of the so-called "Islamic State" (ISIS/ISIL), which was then able to consolidate power and reach roughly its all-time peak of control in Somalia
- Progress in the planned reduction of the African Union’s ATMIS “peacekeeping” force, with the number of bases handed over or closed reaching at total of 18 out of roughly 70
- Political turmoil as the Somali federal government turned against ally Ethiopia over a deal that country struck with self-proclaimed independent Somaliland
- A major escalation in the “Hiran State” movement, with its supporters clashing with federal forces and capturing key sites in Beledweyne city
- The end of the “Ga’an Libah” insurrection in central Somaliland
- Self-governed Puntland state’s latest exit from federal politics, announcing that it would act “independent” even while continuing to say it was part of Somalia
Country Name: • Somalia (English) • Soomaaliya (Somali) • aṣ-Ṣūmāl (Arabic) Official Name: • Federal Republic of Somalia (English) • Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya (Somali) • Jumhūriyyat aṣ-Ṣūmāl al-Fideraaliya (Arabic) Capital: Mogadishu |
Al Shabaab vs. Federal Coalition: Reversion to Stalemate
In contrast to the events of early and mid-2023, as covered in our previous Somalia control map report – and to the ensuing mayhem of early 2025 - late 2023 and most of 2024 formed a period of overall relative calm in Somalia’s decades-long civil war. It didn’t start that way: After the pro-federal coalition’s August 2023 achievement of its highest point of territorial control in the past decade and a half, a dramatic reversal took place. After an immediate, devastating Al Shabaab counterattack on the recently captured village of Osweyne, federal troops and allied militias fled within days from nearly all the areas of Galmudug region that they’d captured over the past year.
By the end of 2023, federal-led forces had recaptured a couple of their most important losses, the city of Eldher and neighboring Masagaway town, and the war against Al Shabaab would settle over the next year into a kind of stalemate. Despite nearly constant claims that it was “capturing” small villages from Al Shabaab, Somalia’s federal army didn’t seem to make much overall progress. Though it did manage to seize Mudug region’s perennially-contested villages of Ba’adweyn, Amara, and Qey’ad, it lost them again a few months later.
Besides re-securing Eldher and Masagaway, the major lasting pro-federal victory in the period covered by this report was the June 2024 capture of Bulo Haji in the far southwest by federal and Jubaland state troops. This has led to a stable presence of anti-Al Shabaab forces, continuing into mid-2025, deep within a major contested area of Lower Juba region.
Before Puntland's Operation Hilaac: Height of ISIS Control in Somalia
As covered in our previous Somalia control map report, early 2023 had brought a reversal of fortune for Al Shabaab in its war with rival religious hardline group the so-called “Islamic State” (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL). After previously being pushed into the eastern fringes of Puntland's remote Almiskat (Cal Miskaad) Mountains, IS was able to put its former comrades back on the defensive. In the period covered by the current report, IS followed through with a powerful counteroffensive against Al Shabaab, driving the latter group first out of its main bases in the heart of the Almiskat, and then possibly out of that mountain range altogether.
Though Al Shabaab and IS share related ideologies, the two groups are enemies. Al Shabaab has sought to exterminate the Somalia-based IS affiliate (sometimes referred to as IS-Somalia or ISS) ever since the latter defected from Al Shabaab in the neighboring Almadow (Cal Madow) Mountains in 2015, setting up its own base in the Almiskat. Though the overwhelming bulk of Al Shabaab’s strength is in southern and central Somalia, it's long maintained a smaller presence in the rugged Almadow and Almiskat ranges of the north (both of which are sometimes confusingly referred to as the “Golis Mountains”).
After its victories over Al Shabaab, IS would apparently spend much of 2024 consolidating its now largely-unchallenged hold over the Almiskat Mountains, building out infrastructure and reaching an roughly the peak of its territorial expansion in Somalia (it may have been present over a similarly-large area in its early days, but now held greater overall influence there). The group's new heyday was fed by an influx of new recruits from other parts of Africa and the Middle East, as well as its newfound role as the financial hub of the global IS organization - and possibly the headquarters of its leadership, with analysts debating whether the group’s Somalia chief was in fact the real face behind the transnational network’s pseudonymous new overlord.
For more details on IS activity in Somalia from mid-2023 to mid-2024, see the timeline of events below.
Notably, this report and the above map show the situation before the start of Puntland state’s Operation Hila’ (Hilaac), meaning “Operation Lightning”, which in the early months of 2025 would wipe away the bulk of IS territory in Somalia through a remarkable military campaign undertaken without the help of Somalia’s federal army. For an account of those events, see our following Somalia control map report.
ATMIS Drawdown: Phases 2 and 3
The period covered by this report saw the continued downsizing of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), an international force made up of troops from Ethiopia, Kenya, Burundi, Djibouti, and Uganda who are widely credited with propping up federal government control in the absence of a strong Somali military. Despite its relative effectiveness and international support, the mission was under political pressure from the Somali federal government to wind down its operations. The first phase of the drawdown, involving the handover of six bases to Somali forces and the closure of one more, had taken place earlier in 2023, during the period covered by our previous report.
The second planned phase of the ATMIS drawdown took place from September 2023 to January 2024, with the handover of seven bases to Somali forces and the closure of two more. This phase involved three more bases in Middle Shabelle region, two more in Mogadishu, and four more in Jubaland state. A base in Galmudug was apparently removed from the list, remaining open after Phase 2 was declared complete.
The third planned phase of the drawdown began in June 2024, with the handover of three more bases during the period covered by this report (two in Middle Shabelle and one in Lower Shabelle), and was still ongoing as of the date shown on the map above. By this time, ATMIS had handed over a total of 16 bases to Somali forces since the start of its official drawdown schedule in early 2023, and closed three more. This still left more than 50 ATMIS bases operating across central and southern Somalia (ATMIS had never maintained a presence in the northern part of Somalia, where Al Shabaab is not an existential threat to regional governments).
Though only partial, this major downsizing of international “peacekeeping” forces would in retrospect set the stage for Al Shabaab’s resurgence in early 2025.
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU and its Fallout
 Claimed Country Name: • Somaliland (English, Somali) • Ṣūmālīlānd (Arabic) Full Declared Name: • Republic of Somaliland (English) • Jamhuriyadda Somaliland (Somali) • Jumhūrīyat Arḍ aṣ-Ṣūmāl (Arabic) Capital: Hargeisa Status According to Somali Federal Government: Northern regions of Somalia, roughly equivalent to a federal member state |
On the first day of 2024, the presidents of Ethiopia and the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland signed a “memorandum of understanding” (MOU) – a kind of international agreement less binding than a treaty – that would launch a year-long dispute between Ethiopia and its ally the federal government of Somalia. Though the text of the agreement has never been released to the public, Ethiopia said it involved Somaliland’s intention to lease a section of coast to landlocked Ethiopia (which had a recently-declared policy of gaining access to the sea at all costs), including the rights to build a military base there. Somaliland said the other side of the bargain involved Ethiopia’s intention to recognize Somaliland as an independent country, though Ethiopia would only confirm that it intended to make an “in-depth assessment” of the possibility.
The Somali federal government, objecting both to any recognition of Somaliland independence and to the Somaliland government’s implied authority to negotiate a lease of the coastline, furiously denounced the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU. It would receive prompt support from Egypt, a regional rival of Ethiopia, while the Ethiopian government would stand its ground. Al Shabaab, an avowed enemy of the Ethiopian government, also fiercely condemned the agreement, and reportedly used it successfully as a recruitment tool.
The dispute’s fallout during the first half of 2024 would include the Somali federal government blocking some flights into Somaliland’s airports (leading to an apparent brief, hazardous effort by Somaliland to disrupt Somali air traffic control), a reported surge in recruitment for Al Shabaab, and an apparent effort by Ethiopia to begin boosting its troop presence in Somalia ahead of any Somali federal resistance. These events are covered in more detail in the event timeline below.
The political spat would still be ongoing as of the date depicted on the map above, and indeed would further escalate over the second half of 2024 before eventually cooling down - a series of events covered in our next Somalia control map report.
Peace in Ga’an Libah, Escalation in “Hiran State”
Of the two small-scale regional insurrections discussed in our previous Somalia control map report, one would be resolved during the following year, while another would escalate. The so-called “Ga’an Libah” (Gacan Libaax) rebellion in central Somaliland would reach an apparently negotiated end less than two months after it began, with fighters laying down arms at the height of their movement’s purported territorial influence.
Meanwhile, in central Somalia, the movement for a self-proclaimed “Hiran State” (also spelled Hiiraan State) doubled down in early 2024, insisting on the Hiran region's separation in actual practice from the federal state of Hirshabelle. The dubiously-declared “state” would enter into its first major confrontation with the Somali federal government since declaring statehood (some conflict had already happened in previous years, before the movement explicitly declared statehood).
After Djiboutian ATMIS troops stopped guarding the Hiran regional government building in Beledweyne in March 2024, militias aligned with the “Hiran State” movement moved in to seize it and other facilities from the Hirshabelle state government, entering into battle with Somalia's federal army in the process. “Hiran State” supporters didn't object to federal authority in principle, and up to this time, these militias – which are generally also members of the so-called “Ma’awisley” movement allied with the federal government against Al Shabaab – had mostly been cooperating with the army.
And indeed, affiliated militias would apparently continue fighting side by side with the federal army across Hiran, even as some of their units maintained a standoff against that same army in the heart of Beledweyne. But their opposition to the Hirshabelle state administration wasn’t so nuanced, with its officials and security forces more or less shut out of the region except in certain areas, like the town of Mataban, that were dominated by rival militias.
More details of these events are chronicled in the event timeline below, and the eventual resolution of the standoff is covered in our next Somalia control map report.
Puntland’s “Independent” Path
Somalia’s Puntland state made news in March 2024 by declaring that it would cut ties with Somalia’s federal government and temporarily exercise the “full powers of an independent state”, amid a bitter political dispute with federal leaders over the future of Somali politics. Puntland has suspended ties with the Mogadishu government before, and though this may have been its most strongly-worded breakup yet, the renegade state has continued to say that it's part of Somalia. That is, the declaration shouldn’t be taken to mean that Puntland now considers itself an “independent country” in the usual sense. For a more detailed understanding of this situation, see our supplementary article on Puntland’s complicated relationship with the word “independent”.
Timeline of Events
August 26-30, 2023
In what would become a major turning point in the latest chapter of the war with Al Shabaab, the Al Qaeda affiliated rebel group recaptured Osweyne (Cowsweyne) village of Galgadud (Galgaduud) region, seized by federal-aligned forces just days earlier, in a bloody attack that it claimed killed almost 200 soldiers.
The next day, federal troops also withdrew from Budbud village west of Osweyne, which they had reportedly captured five days earlier on August 22.
On August 28, they withdrew from Wabho (Wabxo), west of Elbur, with Al Shabaab reassuming control within a day. The federal forces had held it for only a week, since August 21. Later in the day Al Shabaab reportedly took over Masagaway, Gal’ad (Galcad), and the major town of Eldher (Ceel Dheer) amid more federal withdrawals.
On the night of August 29, federal forces withdrew from the major town of Elbur (Ceel Buur), which they had captured only four days earlier, on August 25, without a fight. Al Shabaab reportedly returned to the town the next day.
For some time the Somali federal government pretended as if none of these withdrawals had happened, only making statements vaguely implying victories against Al Shabaab, while a military commander contacted by journalists admitted “small strategic retreats”.
August 28, 2023
The SSC-Khatumo (SSC-Khaatumo) movement, which seeks to create a new federal state of Somalia in the north, declared a unilateral ceasefire with self-proclaimed independent Somaliland after a bloody eight-month-long conflict between the two. SSC-Khatumo, represented militarily by the so-called “SSC” network of militias (see following paragraph) drawn from the Dhulbahante sub-branch of the Somali people, had suddenly achieved its main objective on August 25 by driving Somaliland forces not only out of the Lasanod (Laas Caanood) area, but out of essentially all Dhulbahante-majority parts of Sool region (the group had already been more or less in control of Dhulbahante-majority areas of what it calls the “Ayn” region – see below). The ceasefire declaration by SSC-Khatumo promised not to encroach on non-Dhulbahante territories by pushing further towards central Somaliland.
SSC is an abbreviation for “Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn”, referring to a maximalist description of the regions the militias claim to represent, with Cayn being the Somali-language spelling of the place name pronounced “Ayn” in English (the Somali letter C sounds essentially silent to most English speakers). The very status of “Ayn” as an administrative region is itself in dispute, with the government of Somaliland officially considering it part of the larger Togdher (Togdheer) region extending to the west (not labeled on our map). The “Ayn” area, like Sool, is largely (but not entirely) populated by the Dhulbahante people, unlike the bulk of Togdher, leading to claims by both Puntland and the Khatumo leadership that it doesn’t belong within Somaliland (and opponents of Somaliland independence often argue that the self-declared republic itself is made to serve a different traditional branch of the Somali people, rather than the pluralist democratic principles it claims).
Understand: Is Al Shabaab active in the SSC-Khatumo territories?
September 1, 2023
Al Shabaab fighters attacked the federal stronghold of Qoryoley (Qoryooley) in Lower Shabelle, entering the town for 90 minutes before federal-aligned forces managed to fully expel them.
September 7, 2023
In Middle Shabelle region, reports said Al Shabaab “briefly took control” of a federal base just behind pro-federal lines between Run Nirgod (Ruun-Nirgood) and Masajid Ali Gadud (Masaajid Cali Guduud), but “withdrew immediately” (ACLED).
September 6-8, 2023
In the northern part of Galgadud region, federal-aligned forces claimed to have taken over a frequently-contested village between Dhusamareb (Dhuusamarreeb) and Elgaras from Al Shabaab (ACLED). Two days later, they claimed to have captured another village just to the east (ACLED).
September 7-8, 2023
Small media outlets sympathetic to the Ga’an Libah (Gacan Libaax) insurrection in central Somaliland claimed that the rebelling militia was now in control of more than 20 settlements. The movement had burst onto the scene in late July, accusing the Somaliland government of suppressing opposition party activities, but not disputing Somaliland’s claims of independence. About half of the settlements allegedly under the militia’s control were roughly within the Ga’an Libah-Burao-Owdweyne triangle, and the other half in the area stretching east of Dabagoryale near the Ethiopian border. PolGeoNow was not able to confirm any of these claims, and a few seemed particularly unlikely. As of September 6, reports on negotiations between Somaliland and local leaders connected to the rebels had said the death toll among Somaliland security forces stood at a total of ten people.
September 11, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured two villages south and southwest of Run Nirgod from Al Shabaab (ACLED). The one to the south had been claimed captured by Al Shabaab on August 23.
September 12, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured a village west of Ba’adweyn (Bacaadweyne) in the Mudug region (ACLED).
September 11-12, 2023
The federal army captured the prominent Al Shabaab-held village of Elgaras (Ceel Garas) between Dhusamareb and Elbur in Galgadud region, after apparently bypassing it during their advance on Elbur a few weeks earlier.
A high level political delegation – including the state president of Galmudug, the Somali federal defense minister, and the federal intelligence chief – visited Elgaras immediately after its capture. During the delegation’s visit, a Galmudug state legislator and a Dhusamareb city councilor were killed by a bomb planted by Al Shabaab. (Two more legislators would be injured in a second attack on the state president’s delegation four days later between Wisil and Ba’adweyn).
Federal forces withdrew from Elgaras before the end of the day, retreating to another village just to the northwest, and Al Shabaab reportedly resumed control a day later (ACLED).
September 15, 2023
Al Shabaab captured the village that federal forces had withdrawn to from Elgaras four days earlier.
September 15-18, 2023
Federal-aligned forces reportedly captured a village west of Ba’adweyn, along the border of Galgadud and Mudug regions, from Al Shabaab (ACLED).
Two days later, they claimed to capture the Al Shabaab stronghold of Ba’adweyn itself, as well as the town of Qey’ad (Qeycad, Caad) to its south (again), plus three more villages in the area. One of the villages had apparently fallen back under Al Shabaab control after it was claimed captured by federal-aligned forces the previous January 25. Another was located along the Galgadud-Mudug border farther to the northwest of the one captured on September 15 (ACLED).
Over the next several months, reporting would establish that Ba’adweyn indeed remained under federal-aligned control.
The day after capturing Ba’adweyn and Qey’ad, federal-aligned forces reportedly captured the nearby town of Amara (Camaara) as well (ACLED). Various reports over the next several months, into early March 2024, would confirm that federal-led forces also remained present in Amara (ACLED).
September 18, 2023
In Middle Shabelle, Burundian ATMIS forces reportedly handed over a base east of Mahaday (Mahadaay) to the Somali federal army (ACLED), beginning the second planned phase of ATMIS’s drawdown from Somalia.
September 19, 2023
It was announced that the Ga’an Libah militia would officially dissolve and end its insurrection against the Somaliland government, two weeks after the latter had made an amnesty offer, which initially appeared to have split the group. Though some observers expressed doubts that all the movement’s members would end their insurrection, the rebellion would indeed fade from the news after this date. Somaliland pro-government media, for its part, would report the following month that peace had returned to the area.
September 23, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured two lesser-known villages in Hiran (Hiiraan) region, at least one of them apparently located southwest of Beledweyne (ACLED).
September 27, 2023
An Al Shabaab attack on a federal-aligned stronghold town northeast of Buloburte (Buulo Burto, Buulobarde) was reported on as an unusual incursion, probably launched from across the Shabelle River, into the eastern part of Hiran region (which Al Shabaab had been largely expelled from in 2022). A similar attack had occurred a month earlier.
October 5, 2023
Federal and ATMIS troops purportedly captured two villages near Wajid (Waajid), in Bakol (Bakool) region, from Al Shabaab (ACLED). At least one of them was known to be located northwest of the town.
October 12, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured a prominent village northeast of Mahaday, in Middle Shabelle region, from Al Shabaab, as well as a smaller village closer to the town (ACLED). They had made a similar assertion nine days earlier, also claiming to have cleared a neighboring forest of Al Shabaab forces (ACLED).
October 13, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have recaptured Run Nirgod village in Middle Shabelle, just across the state border from Masagaway (Mesegawa, Masagaweyn, Masage Weyn) (ACLED). Al Shabaab had purportedly seized Run Nirgod on August 23, after the federal-led forces had in turn said they’d taken it from the enemy fighters on August 12.
October 17, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured two villages in Middle Shabelle, near the state border southwest of Masagaway, from Al Shabaab (ACLED).
October 18, 2023
ATMIS handed over control of a base in Middle Shabelle, southwest of Adale, to the Somali federal army (ACLED). The handover had been delayed from its scheduled date in September.
October 19, 2023
The Somali federal government announced that it would be officially collaborating with the provisional SSC-Khatumo administration in Lasanod to establish federal-affiliated governance in the movement’s areas of control. The statement was interpreted by many as “recognition” of the movement’s aspiration to form a new federal member state, though it didn’t explicitly grant that.
October 23, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured a remote village in Gedo region, midway between Luq (Luuq) and Wajid, from Al Shabaab (ACLED).
October 26, 2023
ACLED reported claims that a village in the Beledweyne area had been captured by Al Shabaab. However, based on the place name, they appeared to be referring to a place far to the west of the city, on the border of Bakol and Hiran regions, that was thought to already be under the group’s control.
October 29, 2023
The federal president of Somalia announced that he was appointing the defiant governor of Hiran region, who had rejected his own removal by the Hirshabelle state president in June, to a new position as official federal liaison to the “Ma’awisley”. Ma’awisley (Macawisley, Macawiisleey) is a romanticized term for community militias repurposed to aggressively oppose Al Shabaab, who have served as a major ally of the federal government in central Somalia since rising up against the latter group in 2022. The term can include various separate armed groups: It almost always includes most of the federal-aligned militias in Hiran region, and often also includes most of those in Middle Shabelle and many in Galgadud and Mudug. (The governments of Jubaland and South West states have been generally less supportive of this kind of paramilitary mobilization, with locals seeking to fight Al Shabaab instead expected to serve directly in state security forces.)
The defiant Hiran governor was already an influential figure among the most prominent network of militias participating in the “Ma’awisley” movement, who were largely supportive of his unilateral declaration in June of a new “Hiran State” (also spelled “Hiiraan State”) separate from Hirshabelle, and his orders banning Hirshabelle officials from the city of Beledweyne. The new appointment appeared to be a kind of peace offering from the federal government, which was politically more friendly with the Hirshabelle administration, but so far hadn’t clashed directly with the “Hiran State” forces since their statehood declaration.
Hiran State was not recognized by the federal government, despite its claim to be one of the federal states of Somalia. In fact the federal constitution specifies that new states must be made up of at least two administrative regions (of which Hiran is only one). The Hiran State movement’s grievances are related to a dispute between two different traditional sub-branches of the Somali people, both involved in the “Ma’awisley” movement but based in Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions respectively, over how power should be balanced between them in state politics. The current president of Hirshabelle was from the branch based in Middle Shabelle.
November 4, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured three villages in Bakol region from Al Shabaab. At least one of them appeared to be located midway between Rabdhure (Rab Dhuure) and Wajid (ACLED).
November 5, 2023
The United States agreed to erase more than a billion US dollars of loans that Somalia’s government legally owed to it, about a quarter of Somalia’s total outstanding debt. Most of Somalia’s debt came from loans made to its former dictatorship before 1991, plus interest built up during the 1990s and 2000s when the country had no established national government. A group of countries including the US had agreed earlier in the year to cancel about two billion US dollars’ worth of Somalia’s debt.
November 6, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured several villages from Al Shabaab near the border of Middle Shabelle and Galgadud regions (ACLED). At least one of them was located southwest of Masagaway (ACLED). Another one, located west of Masagaway, had been claimed recaptured by Al Shabaab on August 23. By early 2025, the latter village would apparently be under Al Shabaab control again (ACLED).
November 8, 2023
SSC-Khatumo forces claimed to have repelled an attack by the Somaliland military, with other sources confirming only that a major battle occurred at a village midway between Og (Oog) and Qorilugud (ACLED). The same area would be the site of another major battle later in the month, with the final status of the village unclear.
November 16, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured a village from Al Shabaab near Hudur (Xudur) town of Bakol region (ACLED).
November 24, 2023
Somalia, represented by the federal government, was officially approved for membership in the East African Community (EAC), the main international bloc working towards integration in the region. The approval was agreed upon at a meeting of the member countries’ leaders in Tanzania (located two countries to the south of Somalia, not shown on map).
December 1, 2023
The New York-based United Nations (UN) Security Council voted to fully repeal a general arms embargo on Somalia, which had made it illegal by international law to provide weapons to armed forces in Somalia since 1992, though starting from 2013 more and more exceptions had been made for the Somali federal government. The Security Council now put in place a new embargo specifically forbidding weapons transfers to Al Shabaab.
December 3, 2023
Federal forces and so-called “Ma’awisley” militiamen reportedly recaptured Masagaway and Eldher towns from Al Shabaab, apparently for the first time since abandoning them in the aftermath of their August 26 defeat in Osweyne. However, a report said the federal-aligned forces “strategically retreated” from Masagaway the same day.
December 4, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured a village east of Dhusamareb from Al Shabaab, while another village northeast of the city was also reported taken by a federal-aligned militia (ACLED).
December 7, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured a village just west of Harardhere (Xarardheere) in Mudug region (ACLED). In Hiran region, they claimed to have seized the prominent village of Ji’ibow (Jicibow) in Hiran region (ACLED), but reports over the next year would suggest that they hadn’t held onto it (ACLED).
December 11-12, 2023
Fighters loyal to the so-called “Islamic State” (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) claimed to have expelled Al Shabaab from the latter group’s main base in the central Almiskat (Cal Miskaad) Mountains just southeast of Dhadar (Dhaadaar), and to have retaken all areas lost to the rival group in previous years. It was implied that Al Shabaab fighters had also evacuated several other positions in the surrounding valley after losing the base. An IS propaganda report acknowledged that the separate Almadow (Cal Madow) Mountains west of Bosaso (Bossaso) were still an area of Al Shabaab influence, and a later IS report would acknowledge that Al Shabaab also remained in parts of the Almiskat Mountains at this time. An infographic distributed by IS claimed its fighters had captured ten villages from Al Shabaab since February.
Though Al Shabaab and IS share related ideologies, the two groups are enemies, with Al Shabaab seeking to exterminate the Somalia-based IS affiliate ever since the latter deserted from Al Shabaab in the Almadow Mountains in 2015, setting up its own base in the Almiskat.
December 14, 2023
Unspecified foreign forces allied with Somalia’s federal government reportedly carried out an airstrike on Al Shabaab at a village of Mudug region midway between Harardhere town and the border with Galgadud region to the west (the US military, once the main purveyor of such strikes, did not claim involvement, and many airstrikes in Somalia are now believed to be conducted by Turkish forces). A report the following year would claim that federal forces had captured the village around this time, though concurrent reporting did not seem to strongly support this. On the other hand, one report did claim that federal forces seized a forested mountain base in the area from Al Shabaab at this time.
Meanwhile, reports once again claimed that federal-aligned forces had retaken Run Nirgod village in Middle Shabelle (ACLED), after the same claim had been made on October 13.
December 16, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured a village near Ba’adweyn in Mudug region, apparently the same one they had already claimed to capture on September 17 (ACLED).
December 17, 2023
ATMIS forces handed over their bases in Mogadishu protecting the federal parliament house and presidential palace (the latter known as Villa Somalia) to the Somali federal army and police. The handovers had been delayed from their originally-scheduled dates in September.
December 20, 2023
Federal-led forces were again reported to have recaptured Eldher and Masagaway from Al Shabaab, after previous claims on December 3. This time it appeared that they did indeed permanently occupy the two towns: ACLED data would mention on several occasions over the following months that there was a federal base in Eldher, while Masagaway would also be mentioned in January as a federal position.
In Mudug region, federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured a village between Qey’ad and Amara from Al Shabaab (ACLED), though battles would continue there over the next two weeks.
December 23, 2023
The SSC-Khatumo administration announced that its population and associated politicians would not participate in the upcoming Puntland state presidential election, due to its position that SSC-Khatumo was not part of Puntland. This was a departure from previous years, when the residents of Sool region had made up a major constituency in Puntland politics, though the area had also been excluded from Puntland local elections at the height of violence between Somaliland and SSC-Khatumo forces in May 2023.
Two days after the announcement, Puntland’s High Court would declare SSC-Khatumo’s decision illegal. However, the Puntland state president would afterwards voice renewed support for SSC-Khatumo’s right to choose its own path, despite having argued in October that it should be treated as part of Puntland during its transition towards statehood.
In Middle Shabelle region, Burundian ATMIS troops handed over a base near Warsheikh (Warshiikh) to the federal army (ACLED). The handover had been delayed from its scheduled date in September.
December 22-24, 2023
A report said Al Shabaab briefly took over a prominent village west of Run Nirgod after federal-aligned forces withdrew from both there and Run Nirgod itself. However, the group was said to have soon withdrawn again, leaving neither side in control. Both villages would apparently be under federal-aligned control again not long afterwards (ACLED).
December 24, 2023
Federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured a village from Al Shabaab midway between Harardhere and Qey’ad in Mudug region (ACLED). They had previously claimed to have “cleared” the same village on January 23. They would also claim to have captured two other villages in Mudug that PolGeoNow wasn’t able to locate.
January 1, 2024
The respective presidents of Ethiopia and the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland signed a “memorandum of understanding” (MOU) – a kind of international agreement less binding than a treaty – that would trigger a year-long dispute between Ethiopia and the federal government of Somalia. Though the text of the agreement has never been released to the public, Ethiopia said it involved Somaliland’s intention to lease a section of coast to landlocked Ethiopia (which had a recently-declared policy of gaining access to the sea at all costs), including the rights to build a military base there. Somaliland said the other side of the bargain involved Ethiopia’s intention to recognize Somaliland as an independent country (though Ethiopia would only confirm that it intended to make an “in-depth assessment” of the possibility).
The Somali federal government, objecting both to any recognition of Somaliland independence and to the Somaliland government’s claimed authority to negotiate a lease of the coastline, furiously denounced the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU, receiving prompt support from Egypt, a regional rival of Ethiopia, while the Ethiopian government stood its ground (Egypt is located several countries to the northwest of Somalia, and not shown on our map). Al Shabaab, a consistent enemy of Ethiopia, also fiercely condemned the agreement.
January 3, 2024
A federal-aligned militia again reportedly captured the village of Qey’ad in Mudug region from Al Shabaab (ACLED), and a week later (January 11) federal forces would reportedly have a checkpoint there (ACLED). The frequently-contested village had previously been claimed captured by federal-aligned forces on September 17.
January 8, 2024
Puntland’s parliament re-elected its state president to a new five-year term, after its government canceled plans to hold Somalia’s most widespread popular vote in several decades, a system it had trialed in certain districts the previous May. (Among all the areas claimed by Somalia, only the self-declared Republic of Somaliland holds direct elections with universal suffrage.)
January 10, 2024
A UN helicopter crashed-landed under unclear circumstances in an area widely acknowledged to be Al Shabaab controlled territory, in Galmudug region midway along its flight path from Beledweyne to Wisil. At least one of the passengers died and others were reportedly captured.
January 24, 2024
Al Shabaab fighters reportedly “briefly took control over” federal-aligned “bases” in Mudug’s Qey’ad town (ACLED).
January 25, 2024
Ethiopian ATMIS forces handed over control of a base in Kismayo city to the Somali federal army. As of this same date, Kenyan ATMIS forces were also declared to have closed a neighboring base at Kismayo (Kismaayo) and another one on the Kenya-Somalia border southeast of Kolbiyow. They also said they had handed over a base at the Gedo town of Elwaq (Ceel Waaq), which they call by its alternate name of “Burahache” (Buur Xaaji), to Jubaland state forces, though at times over the coming year federal troops would also be reported present in the town (ACLED).
The pullouts had been delayed from their originally-scheduled dates in September 2023. There were reportedly still 56 bases under ATMIS command remaining in Somalia at this time, which PolGeoNow has been able to confirm as approximately correct.
A base in Dhusamareb, Galgadud region had also been scheduled for handover in September 2023, but wasn’t mentioned when the corresponding phase of ATMIS drawdown was declared complete, and there would still be an ATMIS base at the city as of the following August.
Reports from later in the year would suggest there were still Kenyan troops present at two of the bases they had supposedly vacated: the one southeast of Kolbiyow (ACLED) and the one at Elwaq.
January 28, 2024
IS would later claim to have launched a new campaign against Al Shabaab in the Almiskat Mountains on this date, apparently engaging the rival group in the western part of the mountain range. One report said that an Al Shabaab counteroffensive in the Almiskat in January had “pushed past [IS] positions for a time…but failed to capture territory”.
February 19, 2024
IS would later claim to have captured more Al Shabaab positions in the Almiskat Mountains on this date, apparently in a valley west of Dhadar.
February 29, 2024
In Bay region, the federal army claimed to have secured control of several areas north of Baidoa. Though one of the listed areas was Labatan Jirow (Labaatan Jirow), it appeared that the operations hadn’t reached the town proper, which is thought to be an Al Shabaab stronghold.
January-February 2024
As an apparent part of its retaliation against the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU of January 1st, the federal government of Somalia began using its Mogadishu air traffic control to selectively deny entry of some flights from Ethiopia into Somaliland. Since the UN handed over control in 2018, Mogadishu has governed the upper airspace for all of Somalia’s claimed territory, including Somaliland, though Somaliland’s government retains control of the airports within its control zone. (By one account, as of 2025 authority over military operations in Somali airspace had been delegated to the United States, the top ally of the Somali federal government in conducting drone strikes against Al Shabaab and IS.)
Reports from February suggested that Somaliland’s government had retaliated against the airspace denials by beginning to operate a competing air traffic control system, though these internationally-unauthorized controllers did not disclose their alleged affiliation with the Somaliland government, instead simply giving contradictory orders to passing aircraft.
March 4, 2024
Somalia became a full member of the East African Community (EAC), completing the formal process of joining after having been approved for membership the previous November.
March 3-5, 2024
IS would later claim to have captured Al Shabaab positions in two more areas of the Almiskat Mountains during this period.
March 3-7, 2024
In Lower Juba region, Somalia’s federal government said its soldiers and Jubaland state forces attacked Al Shabaab at several villages to the east of Bar Sanguni (Bar-Sunguuni). One of the villages was apparently located midway between Bar Sanguni and the coast.
March 9, 2024
Al Shabaab media claimed that the group had recaptured the major town of Masagaway in Galgadud (ACLED). However, given the town’s location along the road to Eldher, which would remain under federal control without any reports of a blockade, it seemed that Al Shabaab did not hold onto the town, if it was really overrun at all. In any case, by June and July there would again be media reports mentioning Masagaway as a federal-aligned military position.
March 9-11, 2024
Reports said Al Shabaab recaptured the town of Amara in Mudug region, about six months after federal-led forces had established control there (ACLED).
Two days later, Al Shabaab would also reportedly retake the two most prominent settlements nearby, Ba’adweyn and Qey’ad (ACLED), though a “local police chief” reportedly disputed that Ba’adweyne had been seized. Like Amara, Ba’adweyn had also apparently been under federal-aligned control for about six months, and Qey’ad for about three months. A nearby village, apparently the same one last claimed captured by federal-aligned forces on December 16, was also reported seized by Al Shabaab on this day (ACLED).
March 12, 2024
Some reports said Al Shabaab had captured two lesser-known villages in the Mudug region, at least one of them thought to be just west of Ba’adweyn.
March 14, 2024
Al Shabaab reportedly recaptured another village west of Ba’adweyn (ACLED) – the same one that federal-aligned forces had claimed to capture on September 12, just before their last takeover of the larger town.
Meanwhile, fighting broke out within the city of Beledweyne between federal-loyalist forces on one side (including the federal army and Hirshabelle state police) and a militia aligned with the “Hiran State” movement on the other side. The Hiran State forces captured a police station and the Hiran regional government headquarters, though the police station was by some accounts retaken by their opponents the same day (ACLED). Djiboutian ATMIS troops had reportedly withdrawn from the government headquarters just two days earlier (ACLED).
By at least some accounts, the Hiran State movement would successfully shut out the Hirshabelle state government and forces from most of the region over the following months. (PolGeoNow has decided to show mixed control between federal-aligned and “autonomous” forces only in the city of Beledweyne itself, due to that being the only known flashpoint between Hiran State and federal forces; "Ma'awisley" militias linked to members of the Hiran State movement would apparently continue cooperating closely with the federal government in the fight against Al Shabaab across the region, despite their opposition to the federal-backed Hirshabelle State government.)
March 20, 2024
North of Mogadishu, federal-aligned forces claimed to have captured several villages from Al Shabaab (ACLED). Two of the villages were located along the Shabelle River between Afgoye (Afgooye) and Basra (Baasra), and another two were apparently just northeast of Basra. The area had been hotly contested for years.
March 31, 2024
Territory Name: • Puntland (English, Somali) • Arḍ al-Bunṭ (Arabic) Full Name: • Puntland State of Somalia (English) • Dowladda Puntland ee Soomaaliya (Somali) • Wilāyat Arḍ al-Bunṭ aṣ-Ṣūmāliyyah (Arabic) Capital: Garowe Claimed status: Autonomous state in Somalia Status according to Somalia: Federal member state of Somalia |
The Somali federal member state of Puntland announced that, amid disputes over constitutional reforms, it no longer recognized the legitimacy of the federal government in Mogadishu. Puntland state, which was founded in 1998, before the creation of the Federal Government of Somalia, has always said it’s part of Somalia – despite generally being governed independently. (The neighboring Republic of Somaliland, in contrast, has claimed ever since its own founding in 1991 to be a separate country from Somalia).
Since Puntland became a founding member of the current federal Somalia in 2012, the state has suspended and resumed relations with the federal government more than once, though its statement this time was perhaps the most strongly worded yet: The state government was quoted saying that Puntland would operate with the “full powers of an independent state”, while still making clear that it intended to resume participation in the federation once its demands were met at some future date. (Six months later, Puntland would refuse to even participate in a major political conference with the federal government, but would continue to state that it was officially part of Somalia.)
Understand: Puntland’s Complicated Relationship with the Word “Independent”
April 1, 2024
A report listing places that had been retaken by Al Shabaab in recent weeks included the village of Run Nirgod in Middle Shabelle, which federal-aligned forces had claimed to have captured on both October 13 and December 14, 2023.
March 31 - April 9, 2024
IS claimed that Al Shabaab forces “abandoned all their positions in the Almiskat Mountains” after a major defeat by the rival group. The claimed location of the battle seemed to match the name of a village along the southern edge of the mountain range not far southeast of Tasji’.
UN experts would later conclude that IS’s claim to have “taken full control” of the Almiskat Mountains from Al Shabaab was an exaggeration, but they did agree that IS had pushed Al Shabaab at least into the western end of the mountain range, and Puntland security forces confirmed to a Somali journalist that “much of” the IS-claimed narrative was true. Well-known Western think tank the International Crisis Group, in another report from later in the year, would conclude that Al Shabaab had “in effect” retreated from the Almiskat mountains, consolidating its northern force in what the UN experts described as its “stronghold” within the Almadow Mountains west of Bosaso.
The report of the UN experts, published later in 2024, would assert that IS “currently holds no population centres”, while Crisis Group would report that IS in Somalia “holds little populated territory” and that “most of the group’s fighters reside in camps in caves or on mountainsides, rather than in villages.” Puntland media would claim during a later military campaign against IS that there were no civilian casualties because the Almiskat Mountains were “not occupied by people”, which appeared to be an exaggeration: Many of the areas controlled by the group did include areas marked on maps as villages or small settlements, though it was unclear how many still hosted civilian populations. At least some parts of the mountains were inhabited, and later journalism would also report on the area’s use by local frankincense farmers.
Reporting from the following November would describe IS as having about 10 bases in the Almiskat Mountains – a major acknowledgement of IS territorial dominance, though that was still much fewer than the number Puntland forces would claim to have captured the following year. The report would also say IS fighters had built a network of mountain roads connecting their bases to areas south of Bosaso such as Tasji’ (Tasjiic, Tisjiic), as well as to coastal locations, with listed place names appearing to include both the rugged headlands between Bosaso and Qandala and the remote lowlands between Timirshe and Hafun (Xaafuun).
It was unclear when this apparent expansion occurred, but it seems likely to have been largely during the course of the year in 2024. One version of the report would say many of the bases were located in a valley extending southeast from Bosaso into the area between Tasji’ and Dhadar, but most of the provided place names appeared to refer to areas on the eastern side of the mountain range closer to Balidhidhin (Balli-Dhidin) and Timirshe – an interpretation supported by a more authoritative version of the report. Later events would also reveal that Turmasale (Tuur Masaale) – perhaps the most prominent village between Balidhidhin and Bosaso – was also under IS control, and must have been so for some time, given that there was no news about any Puntland state presence in the area since years earlier.
The above-mentioned UN report would also include the district of Hunbays (Xumbays, Xunbeys), well to the south of the Almiskat range, as one of the areas where IS had bases, also mentioning an IS camp “near” the coastal town of Bandarbayla, perhaps referring to the same area. PolGeoNow had several years earlier marked some areas northwest of Bandarbayla as having unclear territorial control status, but since then had concluded that there was likely no longer an Al Shabaab or IS presence there. However, given the claims in the UN report, the map has again been marked with “mixed/unclear” control across an even larger area of sparsely populated land where PolGeoNow has been unable to confirm that the Puntland administration is present, or that IS is absent.
April 5, 2024
According to a Somaliland-based news outlet, the self-declared republic’s foreign minister said that the “Somaliland government no longer recognizes Somalia as a country nor sees it as a state,” in retaliation for the Somali federal government continuing to reject any recognition of Somaliland. It was not clear whether his statement reflected official policy of the Somaliland administration. Given that Somaliland itself isn’t formally recognized as independent by any other country in the world, not much attention has historically been paid to whether it considers itself to recognize other countries or not.
April 26-28, 2024
In Middle Shabelle region, Al Shabaab reportedly captured three villages near Mahaday from federal-aligned forces, including the two that had been reported taken by federal-aligned forces on October 12, 2023 (ACLED). The villages were seen as important pro-federal positions in a forested “buffer zone”, and also as part of the supply route connecting Mahaday and Adan Yabal. Federal forces and an allied militia reportedly retook the most prominent of the villages two days later (ACLED).
April 30, 2024
Al Shabaab fighters briefly took over a village southeast of Beledweyne from local militias aligned with the federal government (ACLED).
May 2, 2024
Federal and allied forces claimed to have captured five villages in Middle Shabelle region, at least three of which were located between Mahaday and the border with Hiran region (ACLED). One of the villages would reportedly be the site of an attack on Al Shabaab the following December (ACLED), suggesting that it may have come back under Al Shabaab control in the intervening period. Another of the villages would become the repeated site of fighting between federal-allied militias associated with rival traditional branches of the Somali people (ACLED), suggesting that Al Shabaab had indeed been pushed out.
May 3, 2024
An apparent off-course cruise missile - suspected to have been launched by the internationally-unrecognized “Houthi” government of the neighboring country of Yemen (see PolGeoNow’s Yemen control map series) - crashed west of Taleh (Taleex) town in Sool region. The Houthis had been attacking shipping in the region as part of their opposition to Israel’s military actions in the Palestinian Gaza Strip. The area where the missile came down was reported to be under SSC-Khatumo administration.
May 21, 2024
A report said Al Shabaab’s leadership had appointed a new commander to lead the group’s “army” (Al Shabaab operates an extensive shadow government, with various administrative branches in addition to armed fighters).
May 23, 2024
Reports said federal-aligned forces attacked an Al Shabaab base in a village west of Eldher, which they had previously claimed to capture on June 9, 2023, suggesting that Al Shabaab’s earlier resurgence in the area had extended at least as far as here (ACLED).
May 31, 2024
The US attempted to kill the leader of IS in Somalia with an airstrike near Dhadar in the Almiskat Mountains, though it would eventually become clear that it had not succeeded.
June 5, 2024
Federal army and allied militia forces reportedly withdrew from their longtime positions in a village directly south of Jowhar (ACLED), though it was unclear whether allied Burundian ATMIS troops had also withdrawn from their known positions there. Conflicting reports mentioned Al Shabaab presence in the village both before and after the reported withdrawal, though various reports from July onward would confirm that both federal troops and ATMIS still had bases there (ACLED).
June 8-9, 2024
In a “massive attack” on the Somali federal army in Eldher town of Galgadud region, Al Shabaab reportedly “penetrated” an army camp before eventually being repelled.
June 9, 2024
Federal-aligned forces once again reportedly recaptured Run Nirgod village in Middle Shabelle (ACLED) after it had by some accounts fallen to Al Shabaab in March (see April 1 entry). The federal-aligned forces would reportedly remain in control there later in June and apparently into July, though the situation beyond that time would be harder to assess.
June 10-11, 2024
The federal army and Jubaland state forces took over Bulo Haji (Buulo Xaaji) in Lower Juba region. They had previously claimed to have captured it more than a year earlier, on April 15, 2023, but this time the capture would appear to be more permanent, with federal officials visiting troops there later in the month, and reportedly again at the end of July.
June 16, 2024
ATMIS handed over control of a previously hotly-contested base in Lower Shabelle region, just northeast of Awdhegle, to the federal army. This began the third phase of the planned ATMIS drawdown.
Meanwhile, a large number of Ethiopian troops arrived in Dolow town, Gedo region, where many of them were already present. Ethiopia was a longtime participant in the military alliance against Al Shabaab, both as part of ATMIS and independently, though its relations with the Somali federal government were currently in a bad state amid the political fallout of the January 1st MOU with Somaliland.
June 17, 2024
Anonymous “senior US defense officials” reportedly said that Yemen’s internationally-unrecognized “Houthi” government was beginning to cooperate with Al Shabaab – a striking allegation given the history of animosity between Sunni Salafi-jihadist groups, such as Al Shabaab, and Shiite movements such as the Houthis and their backer, the government of Iran.
Nine months later, a report from US-based think tank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace would present an extensive summary of evidence of the Houthis cooperating both with Al Shabaab and with Somalia’s IS branch, going back several years and based partly on recent reports from the UN. In April 2025 the allegedly Qatar-backed Middle East Eye news outlet would assert that rival country the UAE had secretly installed an Israeli-built radar array near Somalia’s city of Bosaso to protect its ally Puntland state against possible Houthi missile attacks.
The US officials also said that Al Shabaab had achieved a surge in recruitment after news of the January 1st Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU, due to widespread anti-Ethiopia sentiment and Al Shabaab’s position as a consistent avowed enemy of Ethiopian forces.
June 20, 2024
Burundian ATMIS forces handed over their base in Jowhar city, capital of Hirshabelle state, to the Somali federal army.
June 23, 2024
Federal and allied forces said they had carried out an operation to arrest a fleeing Al Shabaab leader at the beach nearest Eldher town in Galgadud region – a rare indication of their presence along the actual coastline in that area.
June 24, 2024
A report said Kenyan ATMIS forces withdrew from Elwaq in Gedo region on this date, though they had officially already turned over their “Burahache” base there on January 25.
June 25, 2024
Burundian ATMIS forces handed over a base north of Bal’ad to the federal army (ACLED).
Following this conflict? Check for updates to our map by viewing all Somalia reports on PolGeoNow.
Graphics of the Somali flag (source), the self-proclaimed Somaliland flag (source), and the Puntland state flag (source) are in the public domain. Timeline compiled with the help of the ACLED database: Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen. (2010). “Introducing ACLED - Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.” Journal of Peace Research 47(5) 651-660. https://www.acleddata.com/
